Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1975

Standard Optical Company v. Salt Lake
Corporation : Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Gustin and Gustin; Attorney for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Roger F. Cutler; Bryce E. Roe; Roe and Fowler; Attorney for Defendants and Respondants.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Standard Optical Company v. Salt Lake Corporation, No. 13924.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1975).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/141

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAH
DOCWMCNT
KFU

45.9
•$9

OCCK£TMa

UTAH SUPKCMI COURT
ENHCt

wit/?

STANDARD OPTICAL
COMPANY, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.
SALT LAKE CITY
CORPORATION, et al.,
Defendants-Respondents.

URT
TAH

Case No.

STANDARD OPTICAL
COMPANY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
LAWRENCE A. JONES, as Salt
Lake City Auditor, et al.,
Defendants-Respondents*

13924

B R I E F OF RESPONDENT
GIBBONS AND R E E D COMPANY
Appeal From a Judgment of the District Court
of Salt Lake County, Utah
Honorable Bryant H. Croft, Judge

GUSTIN AND GUSTIN
1610 Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for PlaintiffsAppellants

BRYCE E. ROE
ROE AND FOWLER
340 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for DefendantRespondent Gibbons and
Reed Company
ROGER R. CUTLER,
City Attorney
1010 City and County Building
Salt LakcCitfy Utaji 84111
Attorney for all DefendantsRespondents
.*

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
S T A T E M E N T O F T H E K I N D O F C A S E .... 1
D I S P O S I T I O N OF L O W E R COURT
2
R E L I E F S O U G H T ON A P P E A L
2
STATEMENT OF FACTS
2
ARGUMENT:
I. The Municipal Authorities Properly
Awarded the Modified Contract to
Gibbons and Reed Company
2
CONCLUSION

21

T A B L E OF CASES AND A U T H O R I T I E S
CASES C I T E D
Bent Eros. v. Campbell, 101 Cal. App. 456,
281 P . 717 (1929)
7
Beat v. City of Omaha, 138 Neb. 325,
293 N.W. 116 (1940)
Bohn v. Salt Lake City, 79 Utah 121,
8 P.2d 591 (1932)
14,
City Street Improvement Co. v. Kroh,
" 158 Cal. 308, 110 P. 933 (1910)
City of Crocket v. Murdoch, 440 S.W.
2d 864 (Tex. 1969)
Clayton v. Salt Lake City, 15 Utah 2d 57,
387 P.2d 93 (1963)
Del Balso Construction Corp. v. City of ATew York,
278 N.Y. 154, 15 N.E.2d 550 (1938)
Ilcnsler v. City of Los Angeles, 124 C.A.2d 71,
288 P.2d 12 (1954)
Homeowners Construction Co. v. Borough of
Glen Bock, 34 N . J . 305,169 A.2d 129 (1961) ..

i
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

9
16
3
19
17
10
6 '
14

Page
Johnson v. Utah-Idaho Concrete Pipe Co., 118
Utah 552, 223 P.2d 418 (1950)
Jonathan Clark <§ Co. v. City of Pittsburgh,
217 Pa. 46, 66 A. 154 (1907)
Lassiter and Company v. Taylor, 99 Fla. 819,
128 So. 14 (1930)
.'.
Peters v. Ryan Construction Corp., 125 Ind.
App. 542, 127 N.E.2d 242 (1955)
Pyle v. Kernan, 148 Ore. 666,
36 P.2d 580 (1934)
Shulte v. Salt Lake City, 79 Utah 292,
10P.2d629 (1932)
Thomson-Abbott Construction Co. v. City of
Wansan, 9 Wis.2d 225, 100 N. W. 2d
921 (1960)

9
10
11
8
17
4

8

Will v. City of Bismark, 36 N.D. 570,
163 N.W. 550 (1917)

10

AUTHORITIES CITED
10 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3rd Ed.)
§ 29.29
.

14

10 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3rd Ed.)
§29.64
10
10 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3rd Ed.)
§29.83
17
Yokley, Municipal Corporations, Vol. 3,
p. 20 (1958)
.............. ..............,....:..... 3

STATUTES CITED
10-16-8 Utah Code Annotated 1953

11

10-16-28(2) Utah Code Annotated 1953

20

it

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STANDARD OPTICAL
C O M P A N Y , et al.,
Plaintiffs-A p pellant s,
vs.
SALT LAKE CITY
C O R P O R A T I O N , et al.,
Defendants-Respondents.
STANDARD OPTICAL
COMPANY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

Case No.
13924

L A W R E N C E A. J O N E S , as Salt
Lake City Auditor, et al.,
Defendants-Respondents.
B R I E F OF RESPONDENT
GIBBONS AND R E E D COMPANY

S T A T E M E N T OF T H E K I N D OF CASE
These were consolidated actions in which the appellant sought injunctive and declaratory relief and a
writ of prohibition. They sought to have the creation of
a special improvement district declared invalid and to
enjoin further proceedings under it, and to obtain a
1
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writ of prohibition to prevent Salt Lake City from making any payments under a contract for construction of
the improvements in the district.
DISPOSITION OF L O W E R COURT
The trial court held that the creation of the special
improvement district, and the contract let for the improvements, were valid. I t dismissed the complaint for
injunctive and declaratory relief and denied the application for a writ of prohibition.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent Gibbons and Reed Company seeks affirmance of the judgment of the trial court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent Gibbons and Reed Company accepts
as correct the statement of facts as set out in the brief
of respondent Salt Lake City Corporation and the
other respondents.

ARGUMENT I
T H E MUNICIPAL AUTHORITIES PROPE R L Y A W A R D E D T H E M O D I F I E D CONT R A C T TO G I B B O N S A N D R E E D C O M P A N Y .
2
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This action was brought by some landowners who
didn't approve of the Main Street Improvement Project. In their zeal to halt the project, they have campaigned for an administrative straight-jacket and
against equity and common sense.
Plans and specifications for public contracts to be
let by competitive bidding must be of sufficient certainty
and definiteness to enable bidders to reasonably estimate
their costs of performing the work. Otherwise, unfair
competition would result, leading to favoritism, fraud,
corruption, extravagance and increased prices. With
respect to works of considerable magnitude and complexity, however, details of construction often cannot be
ascertained with complete accuracy, and reasonable
modifications are permitted as a matter of necessity:
"It is a firmly established rule that the authority authorized to let contracts for public works
or improvements has th? inherent right to make
reasonable changes o r modifications in such contracts. As many of the decisions indicate, if this
right was denied, the work contemplated urglit
become utterly useless because of some unforeseen cause," Yoklev, Municipa1 Corporations,
Vol., 3, p. 20 (1958).*
In contracts pertaining to construction projects of
any magnitude, provisions with respect to extra work,
quantities, and unit prices are customarily included in
order that items and quantities may be increased or decreased as the work progresses. City Street Improvement Co. v. Kroh, 158 Calif. 308, 110 Pac. 933 (1910).
3
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By receiving bids on the unit price method municipal
corporations can properly let complex public projects
and still maintain the competitiveness required among
bidders to secure the best work or supplies at the lowest
practicable price.
The contract for which bids were received in this
case was on a unit price basis with special provisions for
extra work and changes in plans, specifications and
quantities. All bidders were on notice of such provisions.
Consequently, adjustments in the contract price could
easily be determined. Section 1, 1T2, "Eoctra Work'' provided :
"An increase in the quantity of any kind of
work or material on which a unit price is bid in
the schedule and which does not involve any material change in the name or conditions of the
work, will not be considered as "Extra Work,"
but will be paid for at the unit price as named
in the schedule. If, however, new, additional, or
unforeseen work is required which, due to the
character of the work, operating conditions or locations do not conform to the specification requirements and unit price upon which bids have
been received and provided for in the contract,
when such work or material would be considered
as "Extra Work," and shall be executed by the
contractor, in the manner and under the terms
set forth in a supplemental agreement, which
may be entered into between the Gity Engineer
and the Contractor and approved by the Commissioner of Streets and Public Improvements
and the Board of Commissioners.
"2a. If such agreement is not entered into, then

4
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the Contractor shall obtain an " E x t r a W o r k Or• der," in writing, signed by the City Engineer
• and approved by the Commissioner above men. tioned, describing the work that is required to be
done and the Contractor will be paid for the same
on the basis of force account: that is, he si all receive the actual cost of all material, labor and
• ; rented equipment furnished by him, as shown by
. • his paid vouchers, plus fifteen percent (15%)
provided, however, that the City reserves the
right to furnish, such materials or equipment as
it may consider advisaV.e and the contractor shall
have no claim for profit on the cost of such material or equipment. * * *"
Item IM o. 20 of" the General . .1 -nuiauons,
and Unit Prices/' provided:

"Quantities

"The quantities noted in the schedule or proposal are approximations for comparing bids,
and no claim shall be made against the City for
excess or deficiency therein, absolute or relative.
P a y m e n t at the unit prices agreed upon will be
in full for the completed work and will cover all
materials, supplies, labor, tools, machinery and
all other expenditures incident to a complete and
satisfactory compliance with the contract.
Any
item may he increased or entirely eliminated as
• the interests of the City shall appear," ( E m p h a sis added)
Item No, KJ, "Changes
and Quantifies „*" s tated:

in Plans,

Specifications

"TAr (tity shall have the right to make any
changes in the plans, specifications or quantities
that may hereafter he determined upon as neces5
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sary or desirable either before or after the commencement of the work, by defining them in
writing, and in case such alterations increase or
dimmish the approximate quantities as stated in
the 'Instructions to Bidders/ then the Contractor shall be paid for the work actually done at the
contract rates herein specified, and such alterations shall not, under any circumstances be construed as constituting, and shall not constitute
a claim for damages, nor shall any claim be made
on account of anticipated profits on the work
that may be altered or dispensed with." (Emphasis added)
Such contract provisions have been held not to
render the quantity of work indefinite and not to eliminate competition in bidding. In Hensler v. City of
Los Angeles, 124 C.A.2d 71, 268 P.2d 12 (1954) the
court commented on the common usage and necessity of
similar provisions:
"It is appropriate to observe that in virtually
every instance, except where lump sum items
are involved, the contract documents explicitly
indicate that the quantities of work are approximations. This is a common practice in construction contracts in order to protect against possible
miscalculations and to insure the flexibility
necessary to meet the vicissitudes inherent in this
type of undertaking. It is perhaps the exceptional situation in which the ultimate quantities
of work done comport neatly with the approximate figures used for bid purposes/ 3 P„ 22,
Hensler involved an action by a contractor for
breach of a contract calling for installation of runways
6
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and taxiways at the Los Angeles International Airport. When part of the job site became unavailable the
city attempted to modify the contract in such a manner
that the project was left in an unfinished state necessitating the subsequent reletting of some parts of the
work. The court held that the provisions for changes,
and for increases or decreases in the project would not
justify deletion of an integral part of the work so as
to leave the improvement in an unfinished condition.
The court explicitly stated, however, that the city was
authorized to make changes either to achieve "a more
satisfactory improvement or the elimination of work
not integrally necessary to the project." P . 19.
The case of Bent Bros. v. Campbell, 101 Cal. App.
456, 281 Pac, 717 (1929), well illustrates the right to
modify a complex construction project without requiring a reletting of the contract. The court stated:
"While the extent of the work is indicated by
the plans and specifications, and the amount of
material to be used in the construction of the proposed dem is set forth, ::;nd the excavations to be
made described, they are all in the nature of estimates. In other words, the extent of the excavations to be made and the quantity of material
to be used are approximated only. The kind ojT
material to be used is particularly described. The
ptens and specifications were sufficient to notify
' all patrons of the kind and character of the work
to be done with an appropriation of the amount
and extent thereof, and bids were called for on
a unit prire basis so that each contractor had the
same opportunity to bid, and the interest of the
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taxpayer, in having the work performed for the
least possible expenditure of money, properly
guarded. The estimated cost of the work in this
instance was over $800,000. T h e quantity of
material runs u p into several hundred thousand
barrels. T h e circumstances surrounding the work
and the character of the work itself precluded
the possibility of fixing an exact price for the
completed project. W h e r e the unit price is fixed
for measuring the value of the work done, every
safeguard of the taxpayer is provided . . . " P . 721.
A contractual provision authorizing extra work
and charges was challenged as violating statutes governing the letting of public contracts in
Thomsen-Abbott
Construction Co. v. City of Wansan, 9 Wis.2d 225, 100
N . W . 2 d 921 (1960). I n holding that the provision was
legally included in a public contract the court stated:
" [ T ] h e past decisions of this court make it
clear that changes made after the letting of a
public contract, which alter the manner of construction but do not substantially change the
character of the building or unreasonably increase its costs, and are made pursuant to a provision in the contract permitting such changes,
legally may be made without pursuing the statutory steps required to be taken before the letting
of the original contract." P . 925.
A similar statement is found in Peters v. Ryan
Construction Corporation, 125 Ind. A p p . 542, 127 N . E .
2d 242 (1955). There the court held t h a t the municipal
authority authorized to let a contract for construction
of sewer installation had the right to make a change in

8
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the material used and streets to be paved, and to pay
for the modification in the manner provided in the original contract. The court stated:
"In this, as in other, jurisdictions it is firmly
established that the authority authorized to let
contracts for public works or improvements has
an inherent right to make reasonable changes or
modifications in such contracts. As indicated in
many of the decisions, if this right were denied
the work contemplated might become utterly
useless because of some unforeseen cause." P .
243.
A provision reserving to the city a right to omit
any or all of separate items from a contract for the construction of a sewage plant was considered in Best v.
City of Omaha, 138 Neb. 325, 293 N.W. 116 (1940).
With respect to provisions reserving the right to alter
or omit certain items in contracts of construction, the
court upheld the contract, saying:
"It is common knowledge that such provisions
are in many, if not all, contracts for construction of works of any size. It is obvious that it
has a legitimate purpose, and that is to enable
the administrative body to eliminate, if need be,
unnecessary and auxiliary items, and thereby reduce the expense of the construction after the
cost of the total project is disclosed . . . Certainly it is sound administrative policy for the
city to reserve the right to omit such items if for
reasons of expense or proper construction, etc.,
it is determined best to do so." P . 120.
In Johnson v. Utah-Idaho Concrete Pipe Co., 118

9
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Utah 552, 223 P.2d 418 (1950) this court indirectly
referred to the right of the commission to make changes
in advertised improvements:
"Respondents assume by this argument that the
commission does or should do, all its contemplating before it advertises for bids and therefore, the estimate of the cost of such improvement must be made before that time, and that
only thereafter a contract may be awarded to
some bidder if the bid meets all the requirements.
But there is no such express requirements in the
statute. It is conceivable that a commission may
deliberate anew after advertising for bids and
decide not to proceed with whatever improvement they had previously contemplated making.
Under such circumstances it could hardly be
argued that a bidder would have a right to demand that a contract be awarded. Before an
actual award of a contract is made, the commission can continue its contemplating of the desirability of making the improvement . . . " P . 421.
See also Will v. City of Bismarh 36 N.D. 570, 163
N.W. 550 (1917); Del Balso Construction Corp. v.
City of New York, 278 N.Y. 154, 15 N.E.2d 559
(1938); and Jonathan Clark § Sons Co. v. City of Pittsburg, 217 P&. 46,66A. 154 (1907).
The principles established by these cases and the
various other courts which have construed provisions
reserving the power to omit or alter work are summarized in 10 McQuillin Municipal Corporations (3rd Ed.)
§29.64:
10
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"Although, generally speaking upon due notice
and advertisement, specifications may be modified prior to the time bids are received and opened, notices sent to bidders, changing the specifications after the bids have been advertised for
and received, render the contract invalid. Where,
however, a city reserved the power to omit any
portion of the work, the exercise of such power
was not an evasion of the requirement of competitive bidding even though it eliminated profitable work from the contract."
Only a substantial alteration, such as one which
materially increases the cost of the improvement must
be awarded pursuant to public bid. Some leeway is
essential in large, complicated construction projects.
The situation here is entirely different from that in
Lassiter and Company v. Taylor, 99 Fla. 819, 128 So.
14 (1930), cited by appellants, where a contract, after
being let upon competitive bidding, was subsequently
modified to provide for an entirely different work at a
different price without submitting the new contract for
competitive bids.
The statute governing contracts made under the
Municipal Improvement District Act is 10-16-8 Utah
Code Annotated 1953, which provides, in part:
"(1) Except as otherwise provided in this
section, improvements in a special improvement
district shall be-made onV.under contract duly
let to the lowest responsible bidder for the kind
of service or material or form of construction
which may be determined upon. The improvements may be divided into parts and, separate
11
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contracts let for each part or several such parts
may be combined in the same contract. A contract may be let on a unit basis. If the price bid
by the lowest and best responsible bidder exceeds
the estimated, costs as determined by the engineer
of the municipality, the governing body may
nevertheless award a contract for the price so
bid. The governing body may in any case refuse
to award a contract and may obtain new bids
after giving a new notice to contractors or may
determine to abandon the district or not to make
some of the improvements proposed to be made.
* * *" (Emphasis added.)
Competitive bidding statutes do not prohibit the
making of modifications in public contracts. Under
the final alternative of the above-quoted statute the governing body may determine not to make some of the
proposed improvements. I t is evident that this is precisely what the City Commission determined to do —
not to make some of the originally contemplated improvements. The trial court found the contract as
awarded on June 12, 1974, deleted the following items:
the traffic obelisks, $357,200.00; tree guards, $84,136.00; thickset pavers at the intersections, $389,061.45;
seven-inch concrete underlayment for the pavers, $64,700.00; and the storm sewer, $202,534.50.
The trial determined that minor additions to the
contract were required for completion of the project.
These remaining changes were not substantial, and were
necessitated by elimination of other items.

12
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Deletion of the thick-set pavers at the intersection
necessitated covering the intersection with asphalt paving, the price of which is included in the contract at a
unit price. The cost of the asphalt paving is to be paid
entirely by the city and will not increase the assessment
against the property owners within the improvement
district.
Elimination of the storm sewer required the installation of shallow drainage system. While appellants
allege it was necessary for the city to get bids on the
shallow drainage system this argument must fail in light
of the exigencies of the situation and the necessity of
coordinating installation of the drainage system with
the other work being performed by Gibbons and Reed
Company.
Exclusion of the suspended sidewalk system permitted the use of non-reinforced sidewalk pavers which
were thinner and smaller in dimension. The pre-cast
concrete pavers were required by the plans and specifications of the contract to be made by the Schockbeton
or a comparable process. Both Shocker Construction
Company and Gibbons and Reed Company had received
paver subcontract bids from Otto Buehner Company
of Salt Lake City, the only Shokbeton licensee in Utah
or Idaho. Otto Buehner Company was the only practicable supplier of concrete pavers whose price for such
pavers would have been the same for any prime contractor bidding on the project.
13
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The modifications to the contract were proper in
light of the deletions, inasmuch as they are only incidental to them and were necessitated by the effort to
bring the contract within the budget. The changes made
were of the type permitted by the authorities above
cied. They did not substantially change the basis character of the project, or increase its costs; they were
reasonable; they were in fulfillment of the original undertaking; and they did not vary so much from the
original plan as to constitute a new undertaking. They
were necessitated by a very real emergency resulting
from the need to proceed and the rapidly accelerating
rate of inflation.
Competitive bidding statutes are enacted for the
purposes of inviting competition, guarding against favoritism, improvidence, extravagance, fraud and corruption, and obtaining lowest prices practicable. 10 McQtdllin Municipal Corporations (3rd Ed.) §29.29; Bohn
V. Salt Lake City, 79 Utah 121, 8 P.2d 591 (1932).
With respect to the interpretation of bidding statutes the court in Homeowners Construcion Co. v. Borough of Glen Rock, 34 IST.J. 305, 169 A.2d 129 (1961)
made the following relevant observation:
"The statutes must, of course, be faithfully
observed and any attempt to evade them must be
stricken down. But they must also be construed
and applied fairly and sensibly so as to further
rather than defeat the legislative goals. In the
course of a construction contract, bona fide emergencies may well arise and incidental altera14
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tions may wdell be required. Where the resulting additional expenditures are reasonable and
are conscientiously viewed as being in fulfillment of the original undertaking rather than as
departing therefrom it would clearly be contrary
to the public interest to halt the undertaking and
call for bidding with respect to the additional
work entailed by the emergency or the incidental
alteration. It may fairly be assumed that such
course was not within the contemplation of 0itLegislature. Similarly it may fairly be assumed
that the Legislature did not contemplate the halting of the undertaking pending a further specific appropriation for the additional work required by the emergency or the incidental alteration/' (Citations omitted) P . 134.
When the Main Street contract awarded to Giblions and Reed Company is construed with reference to
furtherance of the legislative goals there is little doubt
as to the contract's validity. Re-bidding of the project
would not have increased competition. It would have
resulted in higher prices and in construction delays.
There has been no claim of fraud or dishonesty in
awarding the contract, and none is justified. I t is not
even alleged that the contract price was for inure than
the work is reasonably worth, or that it could he d*inc
at a reduced cost. Salt Lake City in awarding the contract by scaling down the project and rebidding it did
so-with the very purpose in mind which forms the basis
for the competitive bidding statute — attainment of the
best work and material at the lowest practicable price.
If the court were to set aside the contract as being made
15
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in violation of the competitive bidding statute it would
frustrate the very intent of that statute.
Officers vested with the power to let contracts for
public improvements are given broad discretion in the
exercise of their duties and court generally will not interfere with their good-faith decisions.
I n Shulte v. Salt Lake City, 79 U t a h 292, 10 P.2d
625 (1932) the court affirmed the City's award of a
contract of nearly $118,000.00 for construction of a
storm sewer to one bidding $267.36 higher than the
lowest bidder. After commenting on the discretion afforded those officers whose duty it is to award contracts for public improvements the court stated:
"Courts will not interfere with the decision
of the city authorities in awarding a contract if
such decision is founded upon such facts that it
is not a manifest absue of discretion, is exercised
j n good faith, is in the best interest of the public
and is without collusion or fraud, and is not influenced by motives of personal favoritism or
ill will. T h e foregoing rules are supported by
the great weight of authority. T h e y are founded
upon sound reasons." P . 628.
Similarly, in Bohn v. Salt Lake City, 79 U t a h 121,
8 P.2d 591 (1932), Mr. Justice S t a m p , in his concurring opinion, stated that commissioners have sound discretion in accepting or rejecting bids for proposed public works, and matters relating thereto which will not
be judicially interfered with in the absence of fraud or

16
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bad faith, arbitrariness, caprice, or abuse. See also Clayton v. Salt Lake City, 15 I Jtah 2d 57, 387 P.2d 93
(1963).
In /*///;• v*. Kernan, 148 Or<\ m\. 3(5 P.2.1 580
(1934) a highway contract h;ul ixvn IH which called
for the use of T u p p e r rock for construction. After the
contractor had commenced work on the project, he
found that T u p p e r rock could not be satisfactorily
crushed and was thereafter permitted to siibstitute
IJmpqua river gravel, in hohhn^ tin- i-onirn'-t *«» Invalid, as modified, the Su])reme Com 1 ••" * '•<••_..n .niL

"

"While the courts slioul;! zca'ou*•!. maintain
the right of competitive bidding MI public ii»»
provement contracts, the statutory restriction
relative to the award of such contracts should not
be construed so as to divest the commission of all
discretion in the matter of alterations or changes
in plans or specifications. A reasonable degree
of latitude is essential to an intelligent and efficient administration of public works. See Donnelly on the L a w of Public contracts, §142, If the
rule were otherwise, public interests would be
greatly jeopardized in the event of emergencies
and unforeseen obstacles in construction work,
* * *" P . 584, '

The principles of law established by these cases are
in complete accord with the prevailing view throughout
the country. I n 10 McQwllin Municipal
Corporations
(3rd E d . ) §29.83, it is stated:
''Although, under appropriate forms and
methods of procedure hereinafter considered, the

17
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courts may review the action of city officials in
awarding a contract, in the absence of fraud,
corruption or abuse of discretion, the determination of the proper officers in making an award
will not be disturbed by the courts. Thus while
it is the court's duty to determine whether or not
municipal officials have exercised their discretion
in an arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable manner, and to determine the soundness of allegations
of fraud, collusion, or misconduct, a court will not
attempt to control the municipal discretion nor
substitute its judgment for that of the municipal officials."
The municipal officers in the instant case did not
act in an arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable manner,
and were not guilty of fraud, collusion or misconduct.
Because the bids exceeded the engineer's estimate of
$2,875,189.00 (which had been publicized as the maximum amount of the contract), the City was faced with
some difficult choices: (1) to accept the low bid as
submitted, thus increasing the cost to the property
owners; (2) to reject all bids and re-advertise with
modified specifications, which would increase the costs
because of the inflationary rate in the construction industry; (3) to abandon the project; or (4) to make
deletions, and minor changes incidental to them, within
the framework of the contract as originally bid.
Appellants contend that the City should have
adopted the second alternative in order to comply with
the requirements of the competitive bidding statutes.
However, as discussed in Point I, awarding the con18
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tract as modified to G ibbons and Reed Company did
not violate the mandates of competitive bidding. In
making the contractual alterations, the City and Gibbons and Reed Company acted in good faith and reasonable under the circumstances. I t is inconceivable in this
period of high inflationary trends in the construction
industry that a city should be required to ^--advertise
a contract when it can accomplish its purpose by deletiiig materials from the contraci as bid. Such a procedure would lead to an endless circle of advertising,
rejection and re-advertising and would result in delay
and increased costs, results clearly not in the public
interest.
There is an additional reason the City determined
to implement the work originally intended within the
framework of the first contract rather than to reject
all bids and re-advertise with modified specifications.
To hold invalid the contract with Gibbons and Reed
Company would seriously interfere with the future ability of the City to find contractors willing to go to the
time and expense necessary to prepare bids and enter
into contracts for public works. Had Gibbons and Reed
Company failed to enter into the contract presented it,
iu I iid I Hind rould have been forfeited. The mere fact
that changes had been made subsequent to the bid would
not relieve Gibbons and Reed from the forfeiture clause
respecting the bond. In City, of Crocket v. Murdoch,
440 S.W. 2d 864 (Tex. 1969) a contractor brought an
action against the city to ivco\cr a bid deposit. The
19
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contractor based his refusal to perform the contract on
the ground that the issuance of an addendum to the
contract, of which he had no knowledge when making
his hid, was a material change in the drawings and specifications relieving him of his default. The court held
the addendum did not constitute a material change
which would permit the contractor to recover his deposit in lieu of bid bond. The court stated:
"We recognize that the generally accepted rule
is that where a statute requires that a contract
for public works shall be let to the lowest responsible bidder, municipal corporations or administrative agencies cannot evade the law by
making a substantial change in the contract after
it had been awarded pursuant to the law. If the
deviations from a contract awarded for the construction of a public work vary so substantially
from the original plan as to constitute a new undertaking, the contract could be let only by competitive bidding. However, in order to render the
contract void because of the changes or deviations the same must be substantial." (Emphasis
added) P . 867.
The Municipal Improvement District Act bars
judicial relief of issues that do not go to the equity,
justice or basic jurisdiction of decisions made by the
city commission relating to special improvement districts. Section 10-16-28(2) Utah Code Annotated 1953,
states:
"No "court shall entertain . . . any complaint
that does not go to the equity or justice of the
assessment or proceeding."
20
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E r r o r s or irregularities in ih<- manner of awarding the
control, if any, e.g., deletion of <mnc of the quantities
and specified line items, did not to the substance of the
contract and did not go to the equity or J u s t i n of Hie
proceeding.

C O N r T I'M ION

..

, ..' . . ..,

sail Lake ( i l y solicited and received competitive
bids for construction of the Main Street Improvement
Project. Because the bids were in excess of funds allocated for the project certain deletions and modifications within the general scope of the contract were made.
Because the bids were on a unit basis. I he ciiy was able
to determine ^iu.i? mu mveinents lo make and which
to delete from the contract and still ascertain the lowest
responsible bidder. These alterations were made under
reservations in the contract expressly providing therefor, and were not of such character as to require readvertisement for bids.
T!-<- *'it
eceived the i'n i h; nch; of competitive
bidding, the contract did noi Iia\e a ieudency to stifle
competition and there was no attempt to evade the law.
I n addition, the contract was not against public policy
and avoided delay and increased costs incidental to a
call for new bids. \- *- - L<--'~-:
_ there KJ another motive to uphold the validity of
the contract awarded to Gibbons and Reed Company.
W h e n faced with a contract such as this, a contractor
1\
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is put in a delicate position. I t has to decide whether it
will or will not perform a contract awarded to it in
response to its bid. If it performs, and the contract is
held invalid, it may be deprived of the compensation to
which it would otherwise be entitled; if it refuses to perform, and the award was valid, it may be subjected to
penalties such as the forfeiture of its bid bond, or to
damages for breach of contract.
For these reasons, municipal authorities must be
given some discretion with respect to the making of
awards, the adjustment of contract quantities, changes
in plans and specifications. This is recognized by the
cases which generally hold that the exercise of discretion
by the municipal authorities will be upheld in the absence of fraud, bad faith, or the like. Nothing of that
kind is present here.
The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,
Bryce E. Roe
ROE AND F O W L E R
340 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Defendant
Gibbons and Reed Company
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